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ABSTRACT
The military on the American scene, comprises the largest and most
complex organization known. Multitudinous decisions are necessarily an
integral of such a system all the way from the basic unit, or level, on
through the highest; both in war and in peace. Due to the possible im-
pact on the lives of millions of Americans who comprise the military
world, as well as the national security and the gross national produce,
it is imperative that the best possible and most timely decisions be
reached. In certain areas of responsibility, group-decision making
techniques may allow a closer approach to this Utopian state. Initially,
an over-view of the group decision making process is presented as gleaned
from available information on the subject. A typical military organization
is described to serve as a model for this paper. Some general situations
are presented wherein decisions must be or have been rendered and these
situations are then compared to the overall procedures suggested in the
initial phase of the paper. Finally, a conclusion is drawn as to whether
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OVERVIEW OF THE GROUP DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Much has been written in regard to group decision making processes
and a brief overview of the subject will herein be presented. Included
in this overview will be an attempt to list observable and controllable
variables of the system and some of the advantages which stem from the
group process.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Definition . Decision in its present usage suggests the coming to
a conclusion. According to Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms , "it pre-
supposes previous consideration of a matter causing, wavering debate,
or controversy and implies the arriving at a more or less logical con-
clusion that brings doubt, debate, etc., to an end." Or, in plain
language, it involves a conscious choice or selection of one behavior
alternative from among a group of two or more behavior alternatives.
If only one alternative exists, then of course there is no decision to
be made and nothing to be gained from any decision making process.
Nature of the problem . For any decision making process there has
to be a good understanding of the nature of the problem to which we are
seeking a solution. Therefore, in order to start the solution in the
right direction we have to ask the right question or questions as a
basis for our research. After the right questions have been asked,
there are three steps involved in the decision-making process: First,
an individual must become aware of as many as possible of those behavior
"Decide," Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms.
r.J
alternatives which are relevant to the decision to be made. Secondly,
he must define each of these alternatives, a definition which involves
a determination of as many as possible of the consequences related to
each alternative under consideration. Thirdly, the individual mast
2
exercise a choice between the alternatives, that is, make a decision.
Pros and Cons of the group process . Many tools have been developed
as an aid in the decision-making process: utility theory, risk and un-
certainty, statistical decision theory, theory of games, and various
psychological approaches to decision making. In recent years much
attention has been focused on group size as a determinant of the quality
and stability of decision making.
In a recent book by Kelley and Thibault, the literature with regard
to individuals as compared to group problem solving performance has
recently been summarized, and the conclusion drawn that groups are gen-
3
erally superior to individuals. They allege that there are several
indications of the considerable ability of a group to gather and retain
a wide range of information, an attribute most authorities would agree
to be important for intelligent decision making.
Some authors, however, have debated, or found exception to, the
principle that ideas produced by persons working in groups are always
^Robert Tannenbaum, and Fred Massarik, "Participation by Sub-
ordinates in the Managerial Decision Making Process," Institute of
Industrial Relations (University of California, 1950), p. 415.
3John W. Thibault, and Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology
of Groups (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959).

useful. Allport concluded from his researches that under the stimulus
of co-workers, the intellectual or implicit responses of thought are
hampered rather than facilitated.
In a study conducted by the Franklin Institute it was discovered
that face-to-face problem solving was not as effective as telephonic
or radio conferences. In this experiment with staff officers, all
problem materials were distributed prior to the experimental period.
For each test only the one mode of communications was available for any
particular problem and adequacy ratings were assigned as indicated;
Telephone Radio I Radio II Conference
26.0 23.0 23.8 19.8
This study was not meant to be directly applied to the solution of op-
erating problems but was an experiment in communication media. Never-
theless, the results are interesting and reasons for the low score in
conference situation will be expounded on later in this paper.
As opposed to these views, Lorge found that groups produce useful
and novel ideas. The work done on brainstorming suggests that persons
can generate many more creative ideas when working together than when
working alone. Of course, as Taylor points out, group problem solving
in general depends a great deal upon the relations among the members,
4Allport, F. H., Social Psychology (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1924)
-'Arnold E. Horowitz, Stephen D. Benson, and Edward P. Luckeley,
"A Pilot Study on the Relation of Communication Media to Staff Decision
Making," The Franklin Institute
,
(Philadelphia, Penna. , 1961), pp. 4-9.
I. Lorge and others, "Solution by Teams and by Individuals to a
field problem at different levels of reality," Journal of Educational
Psychology
. 1955, pp. 17-24.

the type of leadership, and nature of the problem. Several studies have
shown that, as compared to individuals, groups are superior at framing
the question to ask in order to obtain information necessary for problem
solving. If this be true, then more effective solutions to a problem
could be reached by asking the right question initially, rather than an
individual stumbling upon it halfway through his research of alternatives.
In the process of administering a financial risk examination to a
group of 131 college sophomores and 42 Naval Management Postgraduate
Students (Appendix B) , the question was posed: "Do you think a more
rational answer to the problems could have been reached by participation
in a small group of three to five persons?" The following results were
tabulated:
YES NO
Naval Postgraduate School 13 29
College Sophomores 116 15
These results could have been easily predicted because there was less
of a decision making process involved with the postgraduate students due
to their past education in business and statistics giving them more immed-
iate, rational answers to the problems posed.
The college sophomores, on the other hand, had virtually no edu-
cation in statistics, business, or finance and thus were more uncertain
concerning which of the answers was the more rational. Accordingly, they
felt that the wider range of knowledge inherent in a group, would allow
them a basis for more intelligent decision making. See comments of
students (Appendix B)
.
Risk Examination developed by Professor Keenan at Western
Michigan, 1962.

In accepting the premise that group problem solving leads to either
better decisions or more successful decisions, we postulate that almost
any organization can utilize subordinates in all but the last step of
the decision-making process as outlined on page 1 of this paper. The
selection of a choice between alternatives remains the sole responsibility
of the manager. However, subordinates can present various alternatives
and render suggestions which may help the manager in reaching a more
optimum decision, and in this respect are participating in the group
decision-making process.
The participation of the subordinate can be either that of a group
with the manager or that of the subordinate and his boss. This technique
should lead to better decision making because the more alternatives
presented, the greater the probability of maximizing results.
VARIABLES INVOLVED
There are many variables which have to be considered as to whether
or not the problem calls for an individual or a group decision.' These
variables can be broken down into three types of forces which are signif-
Q
icant to the executive in making his choice. These variables are:
(1) Forces in the manager himself
(2) Forces in the subordinates
(3) Forces in the situation
These three categories provide a convenient system of categorizing the
rules or conditions which should be complied with in order to ensure
more successful decision making. The following discussion concerning
o
Robert Tannenbaum and Warren H. Schmidt, "How to Choose a
Leadership Pattern," Harvard Business Review , 36:98 ff, March-April, 1958

these three categories is a synthesis of our research on the variables
concerning group decision making.
(1) Forces in the manager . There are several forces, primarily
attitudinal in nature, which involve the superior member (or members) of
the group which will tend to affect the efficiency of the decision-making
procedure. One of these is the extent to which the superiors believe
other individuals should have a share in decisions which affect them.
Obviously, if the superior is definitely of the opinion that he alone
has the necessary qualifications to render a decision, the group process
is doomed to failure before it even begins - if, indeed, it ever did
start under such supervision. Another factor is the manager's own leader-
ship inclination. Without going into a discussion on leadership and its
myriad facets, we can see how a leader views his leadership functions,
or duties, will either adversely or favorably influence a group decision
session. Closely associated with leadership is his ability to direct
and communicate his ideas to the group. Last, but certainly an important
aspect, is the feeling the superior has relative to the judgment and
capabilities of the more junior members of the proposed group. Whether
through his own observations, reports from others, or nothing more than
a psychological rapport with the individuals concerned, the superior
must have confidence in his subordinate members.
(2) Forces in the subordinates . Subordinates should display a
willingness to accept responsibility and have already displayed an in-
terest in the problems which confront the organization. Hand in glove
with this is their personal identification with the goals of the organi-
zation, and of course, their knowledge and experience levels.

In order for group decisions to be really effective, the subordinate
must be capable of becoming psychologically involved, and therefore, must
display at least a minimum amount of intelligence. Further, he must be
able to communicate or express his thoughts to all concerned and feel
that he is making some contribution to the overall effort. The subordin-
ate who is a follower will not fit into this kind of decision-making
process.
It is apparent that for personality types shaped intensely by an
authoritarian system, opportunities for participation may be re-
garded as signs of weakness and leadership incompetence and, on
that basis, may be rejected unequivocally."
When a subordinate is able to become psychologically involved he
is apt to see that the success of the decision he is participating in
may also further his own goal. As in the case of business, a subordinate
could visualize that the furtherance of the goals of the organization
might also increase his job security and pay benefits. In a military
organization, if the "outfit" does well in its competitive exercise
or administrative inspection, the Commanding Officer will be more apt
to reward his efforts with good fitness reports and recommendations for
advancement in rank.
Thus, participational activity not only allows the individual a
closer insight into the organization, but also tends to motivate him by
the association of his personal goals with those of the organization. He
tends to associate himself with the organization and feels a certain pride
in its accomplishment. In short, the subordinate so motivated will become
a "company man."
Robert Tannenbaum and Fred Massarik, "Participation by Subordinates
in the Managerial Decision-Making Process," Institute of Industrial
Relations (University of California 1950), p. 415.

(3) Forces in the situation . Situational factors are concerned
more with time pressures, group effectiveness, and complexity of the
problem. Associated with time pressure is the urgency of the problem
which could lead to concentrated committee work or to impressive accom-
plishments on paper only. If it becomes necessary to arrive at a
decision rapidly, the manager may consider it impractical to hold a
group meeting in reaching a particular decision. If he is familiar
with all the background information and relevant data, it may be more
prudent for him to make the decision himself. The problem, on the other
hand, could be so complex that subordinates may not be capable of or
have the proper experience and training necessary to help reach a logical
solution. In this case the manager with a diversified background and
experience may want to make the decision himself. Under the factor group
effectiveness would come such variables as ease of communication, the de-
gree of mutual understanding and freedom to participate in the discussion,
and the ability of the group to present an orderly treatment of problems.
One of the primary considerations that apply to all members comprising
the group is that they must be educated relative to the situation, the
goals, and the process. Participation on the part of any group or its
parts, may fail if the group tiries to consider any matters outside the
scope of experience of the individual.
Consideration and deliberation of the information presented in the
above forces, and that presented by many other writers on the subject,
will reveal that certain forces must be taken under advisement in the
acceptance of the group process as a decision-making procedure. Even
though participation in a group decision may have beneficial aspects it




We have separated these three main forces for clarification of
variables and rules realizing that there is continuous interaction be-
tween the forces and the variables within each force. This interaction
should improve the quality of decisions due to the breaking down of
communication barriers between the superior and his subordinate.
Communication . Communication really comes into focus once we have
the right attributes in our subordinates and the right environment for
group decision making. Captain B. T. Bashore has raised the problem of
communication in military organization:
With the new organizational configuration it is possible that
frequent communications might be required between, say, a captain
at company level and a colonel at brigade level. The large gap
in status, age, and experience, between these two, the colonel
being perhaps many years away from the time he had to deal with
company level problems, may very well make communications difficult.
The captain and the colonel would have less knowledge in common,
and the scope of the context in which each makes decisions would
probably be harder to bridge in communicating their needs and desires
Sometimes it is very difficult for a subordinate to communicate with a
man who ranks high above himself in stature, experience and rank. The
manager has to recognize this and start working with the satisfaction of
the participants as attitudial variables. We want our subordinates' wil-
lingness to come back and work under the conditions we have set forth
and to gain satisfaction from contributions made at his level. Since
groups are composed of individuals, group functioning must avoid tension
and anxiety and supply a certain amount of satisfaction in the process.
10
10Captain B. T. Bashore, Military Review , 1961, XLI, No. 1, pp. 24-28

We have to make an attempt to control personality variables and not let
them interfere with the decision process.
The problems involved in interactions of subordinates with superiors
helps to explain the outcome of the experiment alluded to on page three
of this paper. Perhaps the reason why face-to-face conferences at the
staff level did not lead to as rapid problem solving as other media of
communication was due to the initial difficulty in overcoming rank/status
relationships. From our own past experiences and those of fellow officers,
we can testify that there is this feeling of uneasiness when first thrown
into a "high level" decision-making group. This uneasiness gradually
disappears with group interaction.
ADVANTAGES OF GROUP PARTICIPATION
Since the missions of our Armed Forces are accomplished through our
officer and enlisted personnel, it follows that they also have a con-
siderable interest in the decisions rendered by their superiors. Because
of this possible interest, "subordinates may have a strong desire, partic-
ularly in a nation with deeply-ingrained democratic traditions, to parti-
cipate in the determination of matters affecting them."
Enlisted personnel . There are many advantages which may stem from
the use of participation with these men at the lower level of the military
^Robert Tannebaum, and Fred Massarik, "Participation by Subordinates
in the Managerial Decision-Making Process," Institute of Industrial
Relations (University of California, 1950), p. 410.
10

organization. The following are some of the principle ones as applied
to the military organization.
(1) A high rate of output which leads to reduced "down time" of
equipment and more effective quality control measures.
(2) A reduction in the rate of absenteeism or absence without leave.
(3) A reduction in the number of grievances leading to greater
morale and understanding among the men.
(4) A greater readiness to accept changes or understanding of what's
wrong with "the good old way" of doing things.
(5) And last, but perhaps one of the most important reasons for
participation is the training a subordinate receives through participation,
This involvement in the decision process is invaluable in giving the sub-
ordinate experience and wisdom which will enable him to be a better mana-
ger when placed in a higher position.
All of the reasons listed above should lead to greater ease in
handling the men with a resulting reduction in Captain Masts, Court
Martials, and other disciplinary action. Individuals participating in
the decision process should have a greater sense of understanding and
belonging resulting in a greater sense of responsibility in their tasks
and a greater willingness to accept authority.
Officer personnel . While the above five advantages accrue primarily
to enlisted men, there are also tremendous benefits to be gained from our
junior officer personnel through participation. D. McGregor has written:
One of the most important conditions of the subordinate's growth
and development centers around his opportunities to express his
ideas and to contribute his suggestions before his superiors take
action on matters which involve him. Through participation of this
11

kind he becomes more and more aware of his superior's problems, and
he obtains genuine satisfaction in knowing that his opinions and
ideas are given consideration in the search for solutions . **
Since managers are making decisions which affect their subordinates,
through participation the individual who was just "doing his job" may
recognize the contribution he is making and his goals become that of the
organization.
Ernest Dale has written that "The acid test of managerial decentral-
ization is therefore the degree to which executives participate in
13decision-making." Or it may be put in this way: How far has the
company moved away from one-man control of all major decisions? Dale
also implies that increased efficiency will be brought about by splitting
the total organization into divisions of smaller units and delegating
to each unit decision-making powers. This practice has been followed by
General Motors Corporation, and of course, is implicit in any military
organization. The advantages to the military's relatively junior officers
from this type of decentralization are numerous. A few of these advan-
tages are:
(1) Officers will be closer to the point of decision making. D3-
cisions will be made at levels where the executives are familiar with the
factors involved. This also cuts down the time and communications re-
quired to make a decision by not having to check with the chief executive
on every matter affecting the organization.
12
Ibid, p. 411
13Ernest Dale, Planning and Developing the Company Organization
Structure
,
(American Management Association), 1952, p. 107.
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(2) Junior officers will become more like executives by accepting
responsibility instead of running to "headquarters" on every problem
that comes up. Thus efficiency will be increased by a better utilization
of their time and abilities.
(3) The quality of decisions is likely to improve as their magnitude
and complexity is reduced, and as the chief executives are relieved of
possible overwork.
(4) Paper work at the top levels of the organization will be con-
siderably reduced by delegation of responsibility and decision-making
functions.
(5) The other advantages which apply to the organization are the same
as those listed for enlisted personnel in the military organization.
Since we have now gained an overall appreciation of the group-making
procedure and have extracted some of the variables that affect the process,
it seems appropriate to take a closer look at the military organization Tv
By so doing, some of this paper's previous references to the military
might be more closely related to the military organization. Further,
a more appropriate frame of reference may be provided for the remaining




MODEL OF A TYPICAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION
In general, the military organization is thought of as the epitome
of the formal organization, with carefully delineated lines of communi-
cation and strictly defined billets or jobs. It has been considered by
a large percentage of interested students as an authoritarianistically
oriented bureaucracy, with all the connotations and conditions of this
14
type of organization as championed by Weber. Though this view does
have some basis in fact, we find that through the offices of socio-
metrically inclined writers and researchers, or due to the changing
climate of organizational theory itself, the degree of formalization is
variable among different military organizations. Of course, it's not
particularly surprising that such should be the case, no more so than
finding such variance among business, governmental, ecclesiastical, or
any other 'type' organization. The characteristic variance applies as
well to the military of the United States as to that of other countries;
indeed, such deviation even occurs from unit to unit of a particular
branch of military service. In spite of these differences, there is
normally a greater degree of orientation towards the organizational goals
throughout the military structure than can be found in other types of
organizations. This apparently contradictory idea is attributed to the
fact that the military organization usually employs a well-defined, well-
publicized and all-pervading doctrine which suffuses the entire structure
T4ax Weber, Essays in Sociology
,




vertically and horizontally. Thus, the general nature cf formalization
and goal orientation in the military.
THE BASIC MILITARY ORGANIZATION
In the light of the foregoing, it can be seen why it is somewhat
difficult to conjure up an image of a typical military organization with-
out referring to the insufficient representation of an organizational
chart. As has been repeatedly brought out by students of organization
theory, the familiar 'pyramid' is too neat and cold a representative
picture and the 'web' is only slightly better. It is proposed then,
that a combination of these two structural types will present a more
complete, though relatively simple, pattern. This pattern, or model,
shall be referred to as the 'Basic Military Organization'. (See Appen-
dix A, Figure I)
.
It is felt that this model shows more correctly the relationship
of the four principles of internal organization as presented by Mooney
and Reiley-*-^ which are:
(1) The Coordinative Principle
(2) The Scalar Principle
(3) The Functional Principle
(4) Staff and Line
1 c
The Coordinative Principle provides for unity of action in pursuit
of a common purpose or the orientation of all activity towards the
-'James D. Mooney, and Alan C. Reiley, The Principles of
Organization
,





organizational goal. The unifying forces are doctrine; previously
referred to; spirit and morale. Additionally, though, there is a nec-
essity for authority and control to "over-see" the necessary coordina-
tion. A glance at Figure I will show that this principle is embodied
within the organization-control being provided through the system of
formal command lines to each of the several levels depicted. Also,
though there are several levels shown, and different orbits of activity
on each level, the entire plateau of the lowest level of action is
within the purview of the top-most level. This idea may be better under-
stood by reference to Figure II (Appendix A), which also clarifies the
use of Dale's "web" suggestion relative to organization form. We can
consider the current model (Figure II) as "webs within webs" or "orbits
within orbits", in which each lower level orbit is included within the
web of authority and influence of each higher level.
The Scalar Principle-1-" refers to the form of organization. The word
'scalar' implies a structure of hierarchical nature. As shown in the
different levels of operation each higher plateau is of greater value to
the total organization. The increased value to the whole then leads us
to accept that the levels increase in rank and authority as they become
successively nearer to the top level. This thought leads us to the
familiarity of the pyramidal organization chart, and it's eventual in-
corporation into the "hive-skeleton" concept. It should be borne in mind
that the principle of scalar also includes, as sub-processes; (a) leadership,
(b) delegation, and (c) functional definition. The first of these sub
--^Ernest Dale, op. cit .
18Mooney and Re i ley, op. cit.
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ideas is shown in the chart by the fact that each unit of the whole organi-
zation has under its purview a miniature "hive-skeleton" of which that
unit is the leader. The expanding horizontal development graphically
depicts the necessity for delegation and the separate, but contained,
orbits of activity lend themselves to the functional definition thought.
The Functional Principle y primarily comprises the concept of special-
ization, but with the specialist still operating internally and as an in-
tegral part of the whole organization. Naturally, as a part of the en-
tirety it follows that the specialist should be oriented towards the common
goals as well as any other unit or individual. If a group of specialists
are to be considered, they can be added to any - or each - plateau shown
in the model or within any orbit of operation. Indedd, they may be
assigned their own orbit since the model lends itself to expansion, addi-
tion or contraction on any level; or to scaler extension; with relative
ease.
STAFF AND LINE RELATIONSHIPS
90The Staff and Line^u relationship is envisioned as representing
authority and staff advice and idea, though the authority is not a
double-track system. The only line of direct authority between levels
is that as depicted in Figure I. It is necessary that the staff of a
particular headquarters pursue their primary purpose of advice, special
knowledge and coordinative functioning for the headquarters to which they





unifying factor between levels in their advice to lower plateau line
elements as well as to lower level staffs. This principle is represented
by Figure III (Appendix A)
.
The model, as presented, can show these important relationships of
principles of operation, as well as other information.
If lines of interaction other than the strictly formal ones are
added to the basic concept, the vital motion and activity of the organi-
zation becomes apparent. In Figure IV (Appendix A) we have added pseudo-
formal lines between a line unit of one level to the general staff
offices of another; between staff members of one level to their opposite
numbers on another; and between staffs of one level to their opposite
numbers of another; and between staffs of one level. Though only repre-
sentee lines are shown, it suffices to show how the addition of just
these lines - some horizontal and some diagonal - can add life to the
model. Addition of all such lines, plus strictly informal lines of
interaction would serve to tie the basic pattern into a unified, closely
structured and cohesive entirety but, not a solid mass impervious to ex-
ternal influence.
Though Figures III and IV have titles indicated thereon for the units
of the several levels, and even the staff offices, there is no implica-
tion that the model represents only one type of military organization.
The pattern can be applied to any military organization merely by changing
the names at each level, changing the number of units on a particular
level or in a particular order - (or the number of orbits themselves) or
by changing the scalar length. The addition of special staff offices to
the staff orbit, and for changing the titles of the offices themselves
can be accomplished without affecting the operative characteristics of
18

the model at all. For example: The topmost level could be called
Regiment, Air Group or Destroyer Squadron; the next lower then would be
Battalion or Air Squadron or Destroyer Division; next could be Company,
Air Flight or DD834, and the lowest would be platoon, individual air-
craft, or department. It's entirely possible to use the model for a
combatant, combat support or service-support organization with equal
ease, since it appears that the primary differences in the organizations
of the military relate more to the name and mission of the particular
service rather than to the organizational structure. The point is, the
basic model, with minor modifications, may be used to represent any
military organization and can, therefore, be referred to as a typical
military organization.
Without succumbing to the temptation of further expansion of the
hive-skeleton concept at this point, we can turn to the decision making





SOME MILITARY SITUATIONS FOR DECISION MAKING
It can be readily surmised that decisions are continuously required
in the military. This operational trait is integral to the organiza-
tion all the way from the basic level on through to the highest. It is
also apparent that a decision reached on any plateau will affect, at
the very least, the level just above and the one just below the level
that is immediately concerned with the problem solution. Decision
making is an organizational process which is shaped as much by the
interaction of managers as it is by the cognitive processes of the
individual
.
Most of the groups to which the manager is exposed provide him with
the intensely specialized point of view of the expert. But since many
questions to which he must find solutions are composite generalist prob-
lems, he cannot rely on only one view. Hence, various special-interest
groups converge or intersect at the managerial point when the decision
i s made
.
During peaceful eras, the emphasis is placed on economical feasi-
bility and efficiency as well as upon the apparently divergent aspect
of continually maintaining the best possible combat-readiness posture.
At war, the securing of objectives, as assigned, at the least possible
cost in men or materials is the omnipresent requirement of any military
unit. The achievement of the dichotomous goal places the onus at the
decision making process for the direction of the necessary coordinated
action in the most correct and effective manner.
20

SPECIFICATIONS FOR DECISION MAKING
Those decisions (and/or policies) handed down from upper to lower
levels will generally contain specification as to: (a) What. The nature
of the mission to be accomplished or objective to be attained. (b) Who.
That is which unit or units on a particular plateau have the primary
responsibility for accomplishing the job. (c) When. A statement of
the time grame as to the 'by-date' of the mission. Not absolutely
necessary, but often included is: (d) Why. A brief statement of the
reasons for the necessity of the job. At successively lower levels the
same specifications as previously mentioned will be passed on, with more
detail. Additionally, there may be some degree of How the mission will
be accomplished, usually in the form of a suggestion or implied by in-
cluding what materials and or equipment and men will be provided to
assist in obtaining the stated objective. The amount of information
relative to the 'how' aspect is dependent upon whether the receiving
plateau is also the 'working' level, or whether the order is passed on
to a lower level for actual accomplishment. When the directive does
reach the working plateau, the spread of activity-causing influence
becomes horizontal rather than vertical.
Since the very size and relative complexity of the military auto-
suggests the necessity for decentralization and this idea leads directly
to a degree of autonomy at lower levels, the question arises as to how
the organization is kept oriented towards a common goal? As was pointed
out previously, doctrine and well-defined publicized policy provides
this sense of direction. The greatest degree of autonomy occurs in
reaching the decisions which deal with the "how' problems. These
21

problems, solved at the working level, cause influence to pass back up
the scalar. The normal case is that the how decision will generate re-
quests for support (or the use of more resources) in order to do the job.
As these requests pass back up the scalar, decisions must be made at each
higher level (considering alternative uses of the resources requested) as
to whether the requested support can be provided without the production
of undesirable 'spill-over' effects. The upward spread of influence
ceases when the request reaches that level which has the organic means
to provide the requested support or the authority to negate the request.
The system of up and down flow of decision influence provides a check
and balance mechanism which helps to provide the greatest probability
of sub-optimizing at each level, thereby leading to optimizing for the
whole. The idea of sub-optimizing and decentralization is explained in
21
more detail by Alain C. Enthoven, who employs a mathematical approach.
THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The military decision-making process is a continuous, self-generating
procedure - whether considered in the light of a peaceful atmosphere or a
war-waging one. It is obvious that the process can directly affect large
numbers of individuals. Indirectly, these same decisions can affect even
more persons - families of servicemen, business and social associates,
for example. High level decisions can even have a pronounced effect on
the flow of money and the economic structure of entire areas, states
91
^Charles J. Hitch, and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1963) pp. 361-405
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and even the nation itself. It is, therefore, imperative that the best
decisions be made by consideration of the greatest number of alternatives,
maximum awareness of side effects (spill-over), and keeping the solution
effectively oriented towards organization/national goals. The desirable
characteristic becomes clear: to use the techniques, procedures and/or
processes that will produce the greatest probability of making the best
possible decision for any situation, under any condition, at any time.
In addition to the steps that have been made by the use of computerized
data, game theory and quantative decision-making, it appears that the
group-decision-making procedures described heretofore may be valuable




COMPARISON OF MILITARY DECISIONS TO GROUP PROCEDURES
As has been implied in previous paragraphs, group dec.ision-mo.king
is more concerned with the best use of the elements of judgement and
common- sense experience - to be used, not alone, but in consonance with
other procedures.
The decision of relating the required training of military units
to the available time, facilities and budgetary restrictions is one that
is a source of continuous frustration to all levels of the military.
Indeed, it often requires that coordinative decisions be made between
services, in such areas as transportation requirements, special unit
participation and use of training areas. It has been the experience of
the writers that all units and levels of operation handle the determina-
tion of such requirements by conference, coordinated planning and cross-
agreement. In fact, it would be an impossible task for one individual
to accomplish. By virtue of this knowledge, we can say that the final
decision, or decisions, on training schedules, for example, is the result
of a lengthy group-process which necessarily involves a large number of
sub-decisions, the majority of which are also group-decisions.
Thus, we see that organization behavior is a complex network of
decisional process, all pointed toward their influence upon the behavior
of those who do the actual "physical" work of the organization. The
anatomy of the organization is to be found in the distribution and allo-
cation of these decision making functions.
The vast amount of detail that is necessary for the compilation of
an Operation Plan or an accompanying Administrative Plan implies that
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multitudinous decisions are reached before the final product is turned
out. Again, these prior decisions are, by and large, the results of
innumerable group sessions. The same is true of various contingency
plans, prepared in a peace-time situation for the possible eventuality
of war. Such resultant collections of decisions obviously do not 'just
happen, ' nor are they the product of thousands of individual decisions -
they are produced by groups of varying size, at various levels, of
varying composition but, nevertheless, groups.
In a large bureaucracy no one person "decides" anything. Every
decision of importance is the produce of individual and group interaction
both inside and outside the organization who are affected by or feel
affected by the decision. A large organization is a system of tensions
into which each individual is expected to bring work - ways, viewpoints,
and outside relationships markedly different from those of his colleagues,
It is management's purpose to draw from these forces the elements of wise
action consistent with the goals and objectives of the organization.
The final responsibility of any decision-making process always rests
with one individual, but the components of a particular decision can be
traced through the formal and informal channels of interaction to many
individuals who have participated in the formulation of its premises.
When all of these components have been analyzed it may appear that the
contributions of the individual who made the final decision are minor
compared to the overall effort.
INFLUENCE IN DECISION MAKING
In determining who actually makes a decision, we have to judge what
25

position a person occupies within the organization, how much discretion
he is afforded, and what methods the organization uses to influence the
decisional premises he selects.
In its most complete form, influence is exercised when a decision
promulgated by one person governs every aspect of the behavior of another.
On the parade ground, the marching military troops are permitted no
discretion what-so-ever . Their every step and bearing, even the length
of pace are governed by authority. Frederick the Great is reported to
have found the parade ground deportment of his Guards perfect - with one
flaw, "They breath," he complained.
More often, influence places only partial limits upon the exercise
of discretion. A subordinate may be told what to do, but given con-
siderable leeway as to how he will accomplish his task. In order to
analyze the influence or authority which is exhibited in any particular
case, it is necessary to dissect the decision into its component parts,
and then determine which are left t>6 the subordinate's discretion.
A subordinate officer then, is limited only by the specification of
the objective of his unit, and its general schedule. He then proceeds to
narrow further the discretion of his subordinates to that portion of the
task which is necessary for them in the accomplishment of the overall
objective.
Thus, we see that in order to understand the process of decision in
an organization, we have to go far beyond on-the-spot orders given by a
superior to a subordinate. We have to understand the channels of commun-
ication in order to determine what information reaches him relevant to
his decisions. The more important and far-reaching these decisions, the
more important become those types of influence which do not depend upon




There are two techniques that are of key importance in the process
of composite decision making and in bringing to bear on a single decision
a multiplicity of influences. These two techniques are planning and review.
Planning is important because of the immense amount of detail which
is possible to include in them and because of the broad participation
which can be secured when desirable. An example is given by Sir Oswyn
Murray (Appendix B, pp. 45-47).
As can be seen from this example, organizational factors take on
considerable importance when compromising between competing values within
that organization. Accordingly, the decision rendered by any one indivi-
dual will affect the degree to which advice offered him by persons else-
where in the organization actually influences him.
The process of review on the other hand enables those who are in a
position of authority in the administration hierarchy to determine what
actually is being done by their subordinates. Review is the means where-
by the administrative hierarchy learns whether decisions are being made
correctly and how the work is progressing at lower levels in the organi-
zation. Utilizing this information, improvements can then be introduced
by the interaction of superiors with their subordinates which will lead
to better decision making procedures.
22Sir Oswyn A. R. Murray, "The Administration of a Fighting Service,"
Journal of Public Administration. 1:216-217 (July, 1923).
27

APPLICATION OF GROUP PROCEDURES
Many obvious examples can be stated which leads on to the conclusion
that group-decision making not only can, but must be utilized in a
military organization. The very concept of correct staff functioning,
for the military, embodies the necessity of group consideration of
various alternatives and the selection of one alternative course of
action at each level, before presenting a solution, for final, yes
(or no) to the 'man at the top.'
These brief considerations are not meant to imply that there is a
requirement that everyone participating in a group process must ultimately
agree with the final decision. There is the necessity in the military
that once a final decision is rendered, everyone must support it. This
is true at the highest level as well as the lowest. This fact and the
idea that group-decision making procedures are employed at the highest
military levels is substantiated by a recent article on the most well-
known military 'group' of the day. *
No evidence was found to indicate, nor is there reason to believe,
that the group-decision process could be successfully applied in all
instances of a combat situation. It appears rather obvious that the time
allowed between the appearance of a particular problem and the action
necessary for its solution is not of sufficient duration to allow the
group process to function. This would seem to be more applicable to
the tactical decisions necessary at the lower levels than to the higher
11J
,
"The Management Team," Time the Weekly News
Magazine
,
Vol. 85, No. 6, February 5, 1965, pp. 22-23A
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level strategic decisions. In addition, the stress of combat cannot but
adversely affect any attempt that may be made to conduct a group session,
Experiments conducted in a simulated combat or situation would seem to
support this contention, since the importance of the solution and the
excessive pressure of time introduces even more stress. It can be
safely stated, without fear of strenuous contradiction, that there are
combat situations in which the group process just will not operate. Nor
should it be incorrectly assumed that the use of group procedures prior
to such combat experiences would undermine the authority of the indivi-
dual who finds himself in the position of rendering such individual
decisions at the time and place required. The very structure of the
organization should eliminate such erroneous postulation.
By reference to these few functions to which many more could be
added by the reader, such as: budgeting, personnel administration,
morale and welfare, competitive readiness inspections, promotion cycles,
and so forth, it can be observed that the group process can be gainfully
exercised within the military. As a matter of fact, the process is and
has been used, though not in every instance and perhaps not called
'group-decision, ' to an increasing extent in military organizations
for some time.






If then, there is a choice to be made between the alternatives of
using the group process or not, which system would render the most effec-
tive, or the best final decision? Through the readings undertaken
during the preparation of this report there was little indication of
which system will produce the better product. Clearly, there are those
problems which might be better decided by the group process and, again,
those which must be solved by an individual decision. It's entirely
possible that even in a situation which would allow the group procedure
to be utilized, the forces present (or lacking) would disallow the use
of the process. Once a decision is made in the military, it is acted
upon and that exact problem will, most probably, not crop up again.
Hence, there is little factual evidence available to make a comparison
of procedures used to obtain results in order to give a concrete rating
to any particular decision. The basic steps in decision-making are the
most important aspect of the procedure to keep in mind (as mentioned
earlier) and the use of these rules will enhance the final decision
regardless of whether it is made in groups or individually. Due to the
advantages of group satisfaction, unifying influence of participants,
training of members in the decision-making process, and the greater
cooperation of all in the attainment of the final goal, it can be
hypothesized that the group procedure should be used, whenever possible,
at all levels. The advantage of relieving top decision makers of some of
the necessary business of making decisions, or, at least of exhaustive
30

comparison of alternatives adds further weight to the use of the group
process
.
It is concluded that the group decision making process can very
definitely be used to great advantage in the military organization. By
the use of the procedures described herein, as applied to the proffered
organization for the military, a more effective pursuit of objectives
or goals at all levels is possible. The group decision making process
is a valuable tool for the manager, irrespective of his relative position
to the organization and regardless of the type organization of which he
is a part. Naturally, there are more instances where the system will
not be applicable in a military organization, but this does not detract
from its usefulness, nor does the fact imply that the principle is at
cross-purposes with the authority required in an 'individual decision'
climate. The basic controlling variables as regards the method to employ
in decision-making situations are depicted in Appendix B, p. 48.
It is recommended that the principles of the process be more widely
distributed through the military structure. Additionally, more complete
research should be conducted into the relative merits of the group-
decision as opposed to individual-decision, to determine more precisely
the differential effectiveness of the two types. It is intended that
the author of this paper will expand upon the proposal offered herein
with regard to the typical military organization. A complete study of
the hive-skeleton concept bears promise of offering a more realistic
pictorial representation of the actual organization as it really operates.
Finally, it is offered that a description of group-decision making and
the recognition of the intricacies of the system should become a part of
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FIGURE II: THE BASIC MILITARY ORGANIZATION-
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Please assume that you own a business with an equity of $95,000.
The engineering department has developed some new products
for your consideration. Seven different new products are
listed with their possible results across the top. Different
probabilities of each result are listed in the left-hand
column. Please place an "X" in each blank describing conditions
under which you would decide to market each particular product.
If you would not market the products under the conditions
described, leave the space blank. Consider each product
separately; that is, you cannot develop two products at the
same time.
If you would develop Product I with a possibility of loss of 30%,
you would "X" the top three boxes in Column 1. (Note, if
30:70 conditions are the least you v/ould accept, you would
certainly accept better odds.) Then, if you would develop
Product 2 only x*ith a 107. chance of loss, you would "X"
only the first block in Column 2.
Loss not equal as you would be bankrupt and unable to lose
more than your equity.
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CO IAL RISK EXAMINATIONS
ENGINEERING ESTIMATES OF CHANCES'
1 OF SUCCESS & EXPECTED RESULTS
ACCOUNTING EVALUATION OF OWNER'S

























107. 907. $45,000 $ 5,000
-
2, 207. 807. $40,000 $10,000
3, 307. 707. $35,000 $15,000 »
4. 407. 607. $30,000 $20,000
5. 507. 507. $25,000 $25,000
6. 60% 407. $20,000 $30,000
7. 707. 30% $15,000 $35,000
8. 807. 207. $10,000 $40,000
9. 907. 107. $ 5,000 $45,000
Instructions: Assume that you own a business which. is considering the introduction
of a new product. Your Engineering Department could estimate any one
of the 9 sets of possibilities listed in the first 4 columns. The next
5 columns represent 5 different firms which you might own. Consider
each engineering estimate for each firm, then put an "X" in the square
if you would elect to produce the product under the particular condi-
tions. (You might do this in real life so the decision could be




COMMENTS OF COLLEGE SOPHOMORES IN ANSWER TO
THE FOLLOWING QUESTION CONCERNING RISK
EXAMINATIONS *
Do you think a more rational answer to the problems could have been
reached by participation in a small group of three to five persons?
"Yes, because I don't know anything about business - in a group there
would be a greater chance of solving the problem because all could
help each other - give each other ideas."
"Yes, - supplementing one's knowledge and background would improve
one's ability to forecast the outcome."
"Yes, because more views on the subjects could be revealed and
discussed."
"Yes, I think an answer could have been reached easier in a group."
"Yes, but I feel it would take much more time because each group would
have to be selected through individual abilities, etc. If you just
picked 2 or 3 persons at random they would not be able to arrive at
a more rational answer. But if they are on a fairly even level, they
could discuss the pros and cons and then arrive at a better decision.
Otherwise I feel doing it individually is better."
"Yes, particularly if at least one of the persons knew something about
business. The problems are rather confusing when one doesn't know what
he is going."
"I would have made a better decision if a group had helped in discussing
the possibilities of success."
"I do think that this could of been handled better in a small group
because the members of this group could bring out some facets that you
didn't think of on your own."
"Yes, in my estimation, groups can usually come up with superior answers
to problems of this nature - maybe not as quickly as an individual but
still more superior."
"Yes. The more persons involved, the better reasoning can be exercised
to deduce the problems, if there is organization in the group."
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"Yes, because someone in the group might of had some experience in
business courses, and would help obtain a much clearer and more logical
way of obtaining a solution t®' the ptftoblem."
"Yes, on decisions of this nature involving this many variables other
opinions would be invaluable."
*This is just a small representative sampling of the answers
received. It's interesting to note that not one of the "No" answers
gave any reason for their answers. Almost all of the postgraduate




AN EXAMPLE OF THE PLANNING PROCESS
IN ARRIVING AT A DECISION
There is very little that is haphazard or disconnected about the array
of Admiralty Departments. The noteworthy thing about them is not their
number of variety, so much as their close inter-connection and the manner
in which they combine to serve those administrative ends which I mentioned
at the beginning of my paper. Perhaps I can best illustrate this by
describing briefly the procedure followed in the design and production
of a new battleship, which always seems to me to be the very romance of
cooperation.
We start with the First Sea Lord and his Assistant Chief of Naval
Staff laying down in general terms the features that they desire to see
embodied in the new design - the speed, the radius of action, the of-
fensive qualities, the armour protection. Thereupon the Director of
Naval Construction, acting under and in consultation with the Controller,
formulates provisional schemes outlining the kind of ship desired, to-
gether with forecasts of the size and cost involved by the different
arrangements. To do this he and his officers must have a good general
knowledge - in itself only attainable by close relations with those in
charge of these matters - of the latest developments and ideas in regard
to a great range of subjects - gunnery, torpedo engineering, armour,
fire-control, navigation, signaling, accommodation, and so on - in order
to be reasonably sure that the provision included in his schemes is
such as is likely to satisfy the experts in all these subjects, when the
time for active cooperation arrives.
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With these alternative schemes before them the Sea Lords agree on
the general lines of the new ship, which done, the actual preparation
of the actual designs begins. The dimensions and shape of the ship are
drawn out approximately by the naval constructors. Then the Engineer-
in-Chief and his Department are called in to agree upon the arrangement
of the propelling machinery, the positions of shafts, propellers,
bunkers, funnels, etc., and at the same time the cooperation of the
Director of Naval Ordnance is required to settle the positions of the
guns with their barbettes, and magazines and shell rooms and the means
of supplying ammunition to the guns in action.
An understanding between these three main departments enables
further progress to be made. The cooperation of the Director of Tor-
pedoes and the Director of Electrical Engineering is now called for to
settle the arrangements for torpedo armament, electric generating machin-
ery, electric lighting, etc. So the design progresses and is elaborated
from the lower portions upwards, and presently the Director of Naval
Construction is able to consult the Director of Naval Equipment as to
the proposed arrangements in regard to the sizes and stowage of the
motor boats, steamboats, rowing and sailing boats to be carried, as well
as of the anchors and cables; the Director of the Signal Department as
to the wireless telegraphy arrangements; the Director of Navigation as
to the arrangements for navigating the ship, and so on. In this way
the scheme goes on growing in a tentative manner, its progress always
being dependent on the efficiency of different parts, until ultimately
a more or less complete whole is arrived at in the shape of drawings
and specifications provisionally embodying all the agreements. This
46

really is the most difficult and interesting stage, for generally it
becomes apparent at this point that requirements overlap, and that the
best possible cannot be achieved in regard to numbers of points within
the limit set to the contractors. These difficulties are cleared up
by discussion at round-table conferences, where the compromises which
will least impair the value of the ship are agreed upon, and the com-
pleted design is then finally submitted for the Board's approval. Some
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